Recent Cases by Editors,
1950]
RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Communism-Smith Act Held Not to Vio-
late Privilege of Free Speech in Conviction of American Communist
Leaders-Defendants, Communist Party leaders, were convicted, under
the Smith Act, of conspiracy to advocate the forcible overthrow of the
government.' The lower court had instructed the jury to determine whether
or not defendants had advocated overthrow with the intent to use force and
violence and to do so "as speedily as circumstances would permit." 2 Trial
Judge Medina reasoned that an affirmative finding would show the exist-
ence of sufficient danger to the Government so that a denial of free speech
would be constitutional.3 On appeal the Circuit Court held that the convic-
tion-and the resulting suppression of speech-was valid since the first
amendment 4 is not applicable when the words which were used create a
"clear and present danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d
Cir. 1950).
The Espionage Act of 1917 5 reintroduced serious restraints on the
exercise of free speech for the first time since the Alien and Sedition Laws
of 1798.1 In affirming a conviction under the Espionage Act, in Schenck
v. United States,7 Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous court, held
that the statute could only be constitutionally applied to words, which, when
used, created a "clear and present danger" of causing a substantive evil
which Congress could rightfully prevent; the danger had to be so imminent
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1949), officially known as the Alien Registration Act,
but popularly known as the Smith Act, sect 2(a) provides; It shall be unlawful for
any person-1. to knowingly or wilfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government
in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of
any such government; 2. with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of
any government in the United States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell,
distribute, or publicly display any written or printed matter advocating, advising or
teaching the duty, necessity, or desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroy-
ing any government in the United States by force or violence; 3. to organize or
help to organize any society, group or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or
encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States by
force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society,
group, or assembly of person, knowing the purposes thereof. Petitioners were in-
dicted under Section three which provides that; It shall be unlawful for any person
to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the acts prohibited by the
provisions of this title.
2. Instant case at 214.
3. N.Y. Times, Oct 14, 1949, p. 15, col. 7.
4. U.S. CoxsT. AMEND. I. Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.
5. 40 STAT. 219 (1917), 50 U.S.C. §33 (1946), as amended 40 STAT. 553 (1918).
The amendment was repealed by 41 STAT. 1359-1360 (1921), and the Act repealed
by 62 STAT. 862 (1948).
6. 1 STAT. 597 (1798). This statute expired by its own terms in 1800. It is
claimed that the unpopularity of the act and the widespread indignation that it pro-
duced caused the demise of the Federalist Party. See CHAFE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES 27 (1941).
7. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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that an immediate check would be necessary." Democratic methods of free
discussion were thought sufficient to neutralize the evil tendency of words
which presented a threat of remote peril.9 However, in cases under the
Espionage Act subsequent to the Schenck decision the Court failed to apply
Holmes' criterion and permitted suppression of words which presented a
possibility of peril, although they did not comprise a threat of imminent
danger.' 0 The Court continued to ignore the Holmes rule when testing the
constitutionality of state sedition statutes which remained in effect after the
First World War, and the "clear and present danger" test was not reas-
serted for many years. For instance, in Gitlow v. New York I" the Court
affirmed a conviction under a statute which prohibited the advocacy of a
particular doctrine which the state legislature deemed dangerous, because it
sought the objective of the overthrow of the government by force. The
Court stated that to sustain statutes of this nature it was only necessary to
show that the words which were used created some possibility of peril.1
2
The Court declared that the "clear and present danger" test was inap-
plicable to statutes of this type, in spite of Justice Holmes' declaration that
the rule was to have universal application in free speech cases.' 3 In the fol-
lowing years the Gitlow case was never specifically disapproved or over-
ruled, but later decisions weakened its force.' 4 The present Smith Act
strongly resembles the state statute which was used to convict Gitlow, and
in the first case which tested the Smith Act the Eighth Circuit declared that
the Gitlow case was controlling,15 the Supreme Court denying certiorari.'"
Yet, two other decisions of the Supreme Court in the same year applied the
"clear and present danger" test to statutes which possibly fell within the
Gitlow classification.
17
In the instant case Judge Learned Hand decided not to follow the
Gitlow case, but claimed to follow Holmes' doctrine, while still finding that
the advocacy of the defendants did constitute a "clear and present dan-
8. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
9. Ibid.
10. Id.; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920).
11. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
12. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Gitlow, a member of the
Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party which opposed the dominant party policy
of moderate socialism, published a manifesto which reviewed the rise of socialism,
condemned moderate socialism and parliamentary reform and advocated the use of
mass industrial revolts which would dev'elop into mass political strikes and revolu-
tionary mass action for the purpose of establishing the system of Communist
Socialism.
13. Id. at 673.
14. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Lazar v. Commonwealth, 286
U.S. 532 (1932).
15. Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943).
16. 320 U.S. 790 (1943). Defendant members of the Socialist Workers Party
advocated the violent overthrow of the government and intended to place themselves
in key positions so that they could accomplish their aim and also intended to subvert
the war effort of the U. S.
17. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state
statute which permitted expulsion of children for failure to salute flag, making their
absence unlawful and, thus, subjecting children and parents to punishment); Taylor
v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943) (urging and advising citizens to refrain from
saluting the flags of the United States and the State).
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ger." 18 Although Judge Hand applied the test, he altered its classic mean-
ing. The decision would permit suppression of words which created a
high probability of danger in the future, although they did not present an
imminent threat. He stated that a failure to suppress now would only
show "indifference to those who come after us." "I This new interpreta-
tion was justified by Judge Hand because the organization of the Com-
munist Party is unique in that it not only competes in the free market of
thought but also acts in a surreptitious manner which prevents attack by
the moderating forces of free speech.20 He found sufficient evidentiary
basis for the jury's rejection of the contention of the Communists that the
Party believed in a constitutional change in government and that they
would use force only to prevent the capitalists from ousting the Com-
munists once the latter obtain control of the government legally.21 How-
ever, the new rule of the instant case which imposes in effect a "clear and
probable" test is not entirely suitable. Though it lends itself to easier
application, there is a possibility that the test will be too broadly applied in
later cases and that courts will affirm convictions of people whose words
would never possibly have the effect of threatening the continuation of our
democratic government. As an alternative the Government could have
indicted the defendants under the federal seditious conspiracy act 22 which
punishes a conspiracy to overthrow or destroy the government, or to hinder,
or delay the execution of any laws of the United States. Although more
rigorous efforts would be needed to secure a conviction under this law, its
use would be more desirable since there would probably be no possibility
of dangerous interference with free speech and civil liberties.
Constitutional Law-Communism-Validity of Non-Communist
Affidavit Requirement of the Taft-Hartley Act-Section 9(h) of the
Taft-Hartley Act 1 requires that union officers 2 file affidavits with the
National Labor Relations Board denying membership in the Communist
Party and belief in the desirability of the overthrow of government by
18. Instant case at 213.
19. Instant case at 212.
20. See Justice Jackson's discussion of methods used by the American Com-
munist Party in American Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 425-433 (1950) (concurring and dissenting in part). (Another factor which
the court considered was Russian military strength and world policy.)
21. Instant case at 212.
22. 18 U.S.C. §2384 (1946).
1. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 143
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (Supp. 1949).
2. The NLRB has held that top AFL and CIO officers were not required to
file the Non-Communist affidavits before the affiliating internationals and their locals
could qualify. The Board decided that the words "national or international" in
§9(h) should be interpreted as commonly understood to mean the autonomous na-
tional or international unions in various crafts or industries, not the great national
federations. Northern Virginia Broadcasters, 75 N.L.R.B. 11(1947). See discussion
MILLIS-BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO TAFT-HARTLEY 546-547(1950).
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force." The consequence of non-compliance places their unions under a
complete disability to assert rights relating to representation, union-shops
and unfair labor practices. 4 The Supreme Court,5 Justice Clark not sitting,
with but one dissent held that the provision relating to membership was
not violative of the first amendment, however, it divided evenly on the
question of the validity of the belief provision. American Communications
Ass'n, C. I. 0. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).6
Section 9(h) is the upshot of a Congressional purpose to stimulate and
aid union members to rid themselves of Communist leadership. The evil 7
3. Section 9(h) provides that there ". . shall be on file with the Board an
affidavit executed . . . by each officer of . . . (a) . . labor organization and
the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an
affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or
affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or
supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the . . .
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods."
This provision was construed by Vinson, C.J. in the instant case at 407 saying
that § 9(h) applies to those ". . . who believe in violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment as it presently exists under the Constitution as an objective, not merely a
prophecy." Justice Frankfurter dissenting on this issue at 415 felt that the words
". .e. by any illegal or unconstitutional methods" rendered the belief provision un-
constitutionally vague.
4. Section 9(h) provides that no investigation will be made pursuant to § 9(c),
nor petition considered under §9(e)(1), nor complaint issue under §10(b).
5. Vinson, C.J. delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Reed and
Burton. JJ., Jackson and Frankfurter concurred on the affiliation issue but for
different reasons dissented on the belief issue. Black, J. dissented. In Osnmn v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950), a per curiam decision, raising the same issues, Minton,
J. concurred with the Chief Justice, while Douglas, J. joined Black, J., dissenting, on
the belief issue, and, because he thought the oath inseparable, felt it unnecessary to
consider the affiliations issue.
6. See Brief for the Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae, pp.
2, 3. Therein is stated the interest of the C. I. 0. Mr. Philip Murray refused to
file a Non-Communist affidavit not because he is a Communist nor sympathetic to
the Communist Party, but because he does not wish to yield to what he considers
an invasion of the constitutional rights of labor freedom of thought, speech and
association.
It seems that labor's purpose in boycotting §9(h) may be taken as a protest
against the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor also feels that the act discriminates against
them in that employers are not required to file similar affidavits. It would seem that
the latter objection could be met by requiring them of employers also.
Many unions, because of the competitive advantage of having access to the Board,
broke the ranks of opposition to § 9(h) within a year after Taft Hartley. By 1949
about 186 internationals, 7,917 locals and officers had complied. Millis-Brown, op.
cit. supra at 547.
7. Incorporated in the preamble of NLRA quoted in the instant case at 387
is the following: "Experience has . . . demonstrated that certain practices by some
. . . (union) . . . officers . . . have the necessary effect of . . . obstructing
commerce by preventing the free flow of . . . commerce through strikes and other
forms of industrial unrest. ... "
In its report recommending enactment of a predecessor provision to § 159(h), the
House Committee on Education and Labor said: "Communists use their influence in
unions not to benefit workers, but to promote dissention and turmoil." H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1947).
Congressmen indicated their belief that Communist union leaders might call
strikes to undermine the government's ability to effectuate its policies.
For a summary of the testimony of Louis Budenz, one time Daily Worker
editor and Communist Party member, concerning the Allis-Chalmers strike which
was called in 1941 to facilitate the then anti-British policy of the Soviet Union, see
93 CoNG. REc. 3519 (1947).
Justice Jackson, dissenting in part, in the instant case at 424 et seq. summarizes
a massive array of footnoted material on the Communist Party.
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to be prevented was the use of the powerful influence of union office-in
part derived from Congress 8-to subserve the interests of anarchists rather
than trade union objectives, by impeding the flow of commerce and, at
present, endangering national security. In sustaining this exercise of the
commerce power, the Court sanctions a regulation of the internal affairs
of trade unions to the extent that Congress may declare that some men
are unfit to bear the responsibility of union leadership when their tenure
would constitute a serious threat to the flow of commerce. 9 This interfer-
ence with the employees' choice of leadership was sustained even though
those to be driven from union leadership are to be identified by their
political beliefs and affiliations.
In determining whether § 9(h) was in conflict with the first amend-
ment, Chief Justice Vinson in the majority opinion 10 demonstrated that
if it was the purpose of the first amendment to foster change through the
laissez faire competition of ideologies, then § 9(h) did not violate that
constitutional guarantee. The purpose of § 9(h) was to remove the pos-
sibility of a surreptitious preparation for the eventual overthrow of the
government." The philosophy of the first amendment was articulated in
free speech cases of a different nature where the question was how far the
first amendment will shield an intellectual appeal when it is coupled with a
call for illegal action. The test for the validity of statutes to repress such
utterances was whether those utterances constituted a clear and present
danger of some substantive evil. The reason for the test in the first in-
stance was apparently the salutary effect of including within the protection
of the first amendment harmless revolutionists and members of philosophical
8. In the instant case at 401 Chief Justice Vinson said: "The loss of individual
rights for the greater benefit of the group results in a tremendous increase in the
power of the representative of the group--the union. But power is never without
responsibility. And when authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the
scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin in some
respects, to its exercise by Government itself." This statement was qualified, the
Chief Justice saying at 402 that he does not ". . . suggest that . . . unions which
utilize the facilities of . . . (NLRB) . . . become Government agencies or may
be regulated as such. But it is plain that when Congress clothes the bargaining
representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both
to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents, [citing the late Chief
Justice Stone in Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944)] the
public interest in the good faith exercise of that power is very great."
9. The NLRB has effected some regulation with respect to the internal
democracy of the union by refusing to certify as a bargaining agent a union that
is not truly representative. The power of the Railway Board similarly exercised to
prevent racial discrimination by unions has been sustained by the Court. Steele
v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The NLRB has followed the
Steele case. In Matter of Larus & Bro. Co., Inc. and Tobacco Workers' Interna-
tional Union, 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945). However, in the Larus case the N.L.R.B.
pointed out at 1082: "The Board has no express authority to remedy undemocratic
practices within the structure of union organizations, but we have conceived it to be
our duty under the statute to see to it that any organization certified under Section
9(c) as the bargaining representative acted as a genuine representative of all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit."
10. Instant case at 393-400.
11. Iid.
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discussion groups.12 Here 'the broad question was whether these appel-
lants could claim the protection of the first amendment as a bar to any
discrimination against them where the basis of such discrimination was
no exhortation to do violence but only the present or probable likelihood
of subversive activity on their part.
13 The Court held that they could not
claim protection where there exists a ". . . combination of those affilia-
tions or beliefs with occupancy of a position of great power over the
economy of the country." 14
The Chief Justice further refused to invalidate the belief provision of
§ 9(h) because of any distinction between beliefs and affiliations.
1 5 Con-
gress determined that the holding of union office and the specified belief
raise a probability of conduct. According to the Chief Justice if the con-
duct is sufficiently dangerous and the probability that it will take place is
high enough, Congress may take proper precautionary measures, such as
§ 9(h).16 It was the strength of that probability which seemed to be the
point of departure between the Chief Justice and Justice Jackson who dis-
sented in part. Justice Jackson organizes a great deal of the available
material on the Communist Party to demonstrate that a Communist Party
member's assumption of union office constitutes per se sufficient conduct
to cause a grave danger to commerce. In fact he concludes that Com-
munists are dangerous and subject to restriction on familiar conspiracy
grounds.17 However, he dissents on the belief issue because in his opinion
the likelihood of misfeasance by a mere believer does not follow with the
certainty that it does from being a member of the Communist Party.
Justice Jackson chooses to phrase his conclusion in terms of the beliefs-
conduct distinction.' 8 But the dogma that beliefs are inviolate has already
been subject to qualification."9 It seems clear that in past cases, free think-
ing has always been curtailed to the extent that government may prohibit
a belief from being translated into conduct injurious to society. Cases in-
12. The most useful judicial analysis of the free speech cases and the "clear and
present danger" test is included in Circuit Judge L. Hand's opinion in United States
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 207-216 (1950) (affirming convictions of 11 Communist
leaders under the Smith Act). The test has been the subject of much discussion.
See e.g., Comment, 48 Micn. L. REv. 337 (1950).
13. Cf. Internal Security Act, Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
See Chafee, The Regulation, of "Communist-Front Organizations in the Mundt-
Nixon Bill, 63 HARV. L. Rxv. 1382 (1950) (a critique); 99 U. oF PA. L. REv.-
(1950) (validity of the Smith Act).
14. Instant case at 403, 404.
15. The Court at 393 acknowledges the significance of its pronouncement and
illustrates it by citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) for the
proposition that beliefs are inviolate, a dogma of great vitality.
16. The majority do not sanction compelling people to adopt proscribed patterns
of belief. Further, he says at 408: "Of course we agree that one may not be im-
prisioned or executed because he holds particular beliefs."
17. Instant case at 433.
18. Id. at 435-445.
19. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (the Court upheld the refusal of a
state supreme court to admit to membership of its bar an otherwise qualified person
on the sole ground that he had conscientious scruples against war and would not
use force to prevent wrong under any circumstances).
RECENT CASES
volving limitations on the exercise of religion afford an example.20 In
those decisions the Court must have considered the effect on the freedom
to believe by holding that certain religious practices could be restricted.
In the instant case the beliefs-conduct orientation was reversed. Here
the legislative sanction was imposed solely because of the existence of a
belief-regardless of the commission of any overt act. But the purpose was
still to prevent conduct which might'create a substantive evil which Con-
gress could rightly combat.
In dissent Justice Black charges that the Court's " . reasoning
would apply just as forcibly to statutes barring Communists and their
suspected sympathizers from election to political office, mere membership
in unions, and in fact from getting or holding any jobs whereby they could
earn a living." 22 To meet this contention the majority laid special stress
on the powerful position of the union leader,23 furthermore there was
special emphasis placed on the fact that unions are not just independent
representatives of the employees, but are clothed with powers derived
from Congress tantamount to an actual delegation.2 4  The investiture of
such power should carry with it a concomitant duty to exercise it in the
public good, as voiced by the national legislature. Lastly the majority
assert this decision in no way is intended to condone hostility toward men
just because of their beliefs or party affiliations--communist or otherwise,-
but rather toward the nmans they have selected to effect their purposes-
violent activity in contradistinction to the more peaceful change brought
about by the majority at the ballot box.
Constitutional Law-Voting-Constitutionality of Georgia County
Unit System-Petitioners brought suit to restrain adherence to the
Georgia Primary Act 1 in a forthcoming Democratic primary election inso-
far as it provided a County Unit System of tabulating votes. The County
Unit System is analogous to the Presidential Electoral System in that a
county's designated unit vote is given in toto to the candidate who carried
20. In forbidding children to perform certain rituals, those conditioned reflexes
that become the faith of the adult cannot be taught. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (children may be prohibited from distributing religious litera-
ture on the streets though gaining converts is a tenet of the Jehovah's Witnesses'
creed). See 98 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 923, 925 (1950) for a comment on state
complsory attendance legislation's applicability to Mohammedan children, whose
parent refused to send them to school on Friday, the Mohammedan Sabbath. The
writer points out that the court's rejection of the appeal to the first amendment in
effect: ". . . denies these children the right to assemble with the congregation in
worship, an immeasurably potent factor in the religious training of the child."
Similarly, if a tenet of one's faith is polygamy, the practice of it may be pro-
hibited which effectively deletes that tenet from the faith. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
21. Instant case at 409.
22. Id. at 449.
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See note 8 supra.
1. GA. CODE 34-3212--34-3218 (1933).
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the county by popular vote.2. Petitioners, residents of the most populous
county in Georgia, alleged that the system unconstitutionally discriminates
against them since it decreases the effectiveness of their vote making its
weight, on the average, only one-tenth as great as that of a vote cast in
other counties. The decision of the district court denying the petition was
affirmed on the ground that this was a political controversy and not jus-
ticiable. South et al. v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
The Supreme Court has always declined to hear controversies which
it considered to be of a "political" nature.3 This political-justiciable dis-
tinction has long been the doctrinal basis for refusing jurisdiction in con-
tests concerning the validity of election systems. Though it is settled that
the Constitution safeguards the right to cast a ballot-even in primaries 4--
for all those who are qualified, compelling considerations have often led the
courts to declare other types of voting controversies non-justiciable. Some
such considerations which have prompted this result are: mootness (where
the election had already occurred) ; 5 fear of the consequences of granting
relief (where election time was near) ; 6 and, at times, administrative diffi-
culties in enforcing a decree (necessity to "supervise voting"). However,
on the basis of discrimination to a class constituting a denial of equal pro-
tection by a state in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
has granted relief to Negroes who have been deprived of the right to vote
in a primary by state statutes 8 and by the rulings of a political party.9
Even disguised statutory attempts to disenfranchise the Negro have been
held justiciable controversies and have been struck down.' 0 Yet, the court
in the instant case, disregarding the issue of racial discrimination, merely
reaffirms the doctrine of the gerrymandering cases 11 to the effect that con-
troversies arising from a state's geographical distribution of electoral
strength are non-justiciable, even though the distribution results in rural-
urban discrimination.
The franchise guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments, designedly adopted to protect the Negro from being disenfranchised
2. For a detailed discussion of the County Unit System, see HOLLAND, THE
DIEcr Pa mARY iN GEORGIA (1945).
3. E.g., Commercial Trust Company of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51
(1922) (foreign relations) ; Luther v. Bordon, 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849) (legal exist-
ence of stafe government).
4. E.g., United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1943) ; United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1940) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1887).
5. Turman v. Duchworth, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Richardson v. McChesney, 218
U.S. 487 (1910).
6. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (concurring opinion, Rutledge, J.);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (concurring opinion, Rutledge, J.).
7. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1902).
8. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1926).
9. Smith v. Albright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) ; Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th
Cir. 1946).
10. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1914) ("grandfather clause" declared
unconstitutional); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (Statute found to have
effect of keeping negroes from voting).
11. Cases cited note 6 supra.
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arbitrarily, should not be circumvented by a state casting its voting process
in a form which permits the de facto practice of racial discrimination.
12
Statistics demonstrate that in Georgia the County Unit System is the main-
spring in promoting and maintaining the suppression of Negro voters. By
significantly reducing the weight of all votes cast-in urban counties, the
County Unit System achieves in practical effect almost complete disen-
franchisement of the entire Negro population of Georgia. Of course, this
fact will never appear from a mere reading of the County Unit Act, nor
even from an intensive investigation of its legislative history; it can only
be discerned by examining the manner in which the County Unit System
operates within the context of Georgia's present-day political structure-
with its traditions of forceful disenfranchisement of the rural Negro.13 In
12. Smith v. Albright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943).
13. The 1940 census shows that Georgia has a total population of about three
million. Approximately 33 per cent of this total live in urban areas and 67 per. cent
live in rural areas. In the urban areas 35.4 per cent of the population is negro. In
the rural areas Negroes compose 33 ver cent of the population. U.S. Census, Char-
acteristics of the Population (Vol. II), Part 2, p. 187, table 5 (1940). In spite of
these facts, the urban counties are the only counties in Georgia where Negroes have
been permitted to vote in numbers approaching their proportional strength of the
total population. The reason for this is that the white rural dwellers are able to
keep the rural Negroes from registering and voting by means of intimidation
and purging of the registration lists. These practices have been employed much
less frequently in the urban areas, and the large cities are practically free of them.
See Kutle, A Lonkq Dark Night for Georgia, in Harpers, Nov. 1948, p. 55; Scott,
Did the Negroes Elect Talnadge?, in the Crisis, Sept. 1946, pp. 9, 226. Moreover,
the Talmadge group in Georgia have conducted their most recent election campaigns
almost entirely on a white supremacy platform. It would be political suicide for
this still dominant political faction to permit negroes to vote in the rural counties,
because, by exploiting those ancient prejudices against the Negroes, which reach a
fever in the rural areas, the Talmadge group maintain a power among the rural
units which is vastly more important than the watered-down urban unit vote under
the county unit method of vote tabulation. See KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 127 et seq.
(1949) ; Reid, Georgia's Negro Vote in The Nation, July 1946, p. 12 et seq.
The exact figures on the proportion of Negroes voting or registering in the
Georgia elections are not available; however, the following statements will serve the
same purpose.
"Approximately half of the 116,345 Negro votes in Georgia are concentrated
in the five 'big-city' counties containing the cities of Atlanta, Macon, Augusta,
Savannah and Columbus. Yet these counties contain less than 10 per cent of the
state's Negro population. In the same counties Negro voters form approxi-
mately one-fourth of the voting list."
Two-thirds of all the Negro votes of Georgia are cast in 16 urban counties (there
are 159 counties all-toM).
"In 46 of Georgia's 159 counties . . . Negroes form more than 50 per cent
of the population. In no one of these counties does the proportion of Negro
voters all all approach the proportion of Negro voters in the population. The
number of Negroes registered was generally reported to be 10 per cent of the
total. But in Webster County, where 612 of every 1000 people are Negroes,
there is not a single registered Negro voter; in Burke County, which has a
Negro population of 19,000 there are only 160 Negro voters .... See Reid,
Georgia's Negro Vote, in The Nation, July 1946, p. 13.
"In counties of the 'Black Belt' (composed of rural counties) most Negroes
were kept from even registering. A Taylor County Negro who was murdered
by a white man the day after the election was the only Negro in the county who
had voted." Kutle, A Long Dark Night for Georgia, in Harpers, Nov. 1948, p. 61.
Thus, Georgia has effectively kept the Negro from the polls in the rural areas and
since the County Unit System effectively cancels the weight of the urban negro vote,
as a practical matter, Georgia's present voting structure effects an almost complete
disenfranchisement of the Georgia Negro.
1950]
416 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99
the instant case there was gerrymandering coupled with racial discrimina-
tion, and on the latter ground jurisdiction could have been obtained. Nor
was the court confronted with the obstacles of mootness and administrative
difficulty-the other considerations which might impel'a denial of jurisdic-
tion. Unless some grave harm caused by destroying the County Unit
System was envisioned, the decision can only be explained on the ground
that the court was extremely reluctant to invalidate the Georgia System
since it was not originally designed to promote racial discrimination and
has only recently so operated.14 But since these explanations were not
voiced by the Court, the question remains: does this decision mean that a
state contemplating a white primary may attain that result with constitu-
tional immunity, by merely devising an appropriate county unit system?
If the answer be in the affirmative then has not the instant decision de-
based the democratic value of those other decisions which tended to trans-
late the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments into workable guarantees
of a suffrage which makes no distinction in regards to race ? 15
Corporations-Uniform Stock Transfer Act-Open-Penalty
Surety Bond Required Where New Stock Certificate Issued to Replace
One Lost or Destroyed-In 1932, plaintiff's testator lost a stock cer-
tificate representing shares in defendant corporation. After his death in
1948, his executor brought an action to compel the corporation to issue a
duplicate in accordance with § 17 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act of
Missouri.1 The trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to a dupli-
cate certificate, representing 18,750 shares, which then had a market value
of $375,000. In applying the requirement of the Act that the owner of the
stock supply a surety bond to indemnify the corporation should there be
financial loss arising from the issue of a new certificate, the trial court held
it had discretion in fixing the amount of the bond and ordered plaintiff
to give one in the penal sum of $750,000. On appeal by the corporation,
the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that the Uniform Act
requires an open-penalty bond, one without limitation of liability, 'as surety
for the corporation.2  Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 231 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1950).
14. See, South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950); Holland, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 44.
15. Yet it is interesting to note that the County Unit System of Tennessee was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Tennessce. Gates v. Long, 172
Tenn. 471, 113 S.W.2d 388 (1938) (violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution of Tennessee).
1. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5563.1 et seq. (1943). The Act has been adopted in
all 48 states, the District of Columbia, Alaska and Hawaii. The statutes of seven
states, however, omit § 17 or so modify it as to affect substantially the instant prob-
lem. 6 UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED 23, (Supp. 1950) 6, 85-86.
2. For a general discussion of open-penalty and fixed-penalty surety bonds, see
CCH FIRE, CASUALTY & SURETY BULLETINS (Casualty & Surety Sections 1950)
Bonds Li-1; UNDERWRITING MANUAL ON FIDELITY & SURETY BONDS, 145, 167 (Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 1927).
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The Uniform Stock Transfer Act makes a stock certificate negotiable
and representative of the shares for which it was issued so that a transfer
of the certificate operates as a transfer of the stock.3 It is thus possible
that a lost or stolen certificate can come into the hands of a bona fide holder
who can assert good title to the stock. 4 Section 17 of the Act, which em-
powers a court to order issue of a new certificate to replace one which is
lost or destroyed, accordingly requires a surety bond to protect the cor-
poration from double liability on the same shares.5 Although the section
was a codification of well-established case law,0 only indirect judicial atten-
tion had been given to the question of the amount of the required bond.7
The pertinent wording of the Uniform Act is sufficiently ambiguous to
allow interpretation, and in the instant case to require it.s Dicta in cases
decided in states where the Act had been adopted implied that the court
ordering the issue of the new certificate had discretion in fixing the amount
of the bond but no direct holding ever established that view.9 Hence, the
appellate court in the instant case undertook an original interpretation of
the statute.10 Its view is that it is a mandate of the Act that an open-
penalty bond be required whenever issue of a duplicate is ordered and
consequently there is no trial court discretion to be exercised as to the
penalty amount.
The instant decision announces an inflexible rule that exacts from the
stockholder an open-penalty bond irrespective of the remoteness of any
threat to the corporation of liability from the issue of a duplicate certifi-
cate. It thereby precludes the possibility of a saving in premium costs for
the stockholder since an open-penalty bond for a particular certificate is
more costly than a bond with fixed penalty.' Adequate protection of the
3. Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 235, 4 A.2d 152, 154 (1939) ; 6 UNIFORm LAws
ANNOTATED 2.
4. Muffat v. Detroit-Macomb Land Co., 252 Mich. 602, 234 N.W. 148 (1931)
(stock fraudulently pledged).
5. 6 UNIFoR LAWs ANNOTATED 22-23.
6. 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORAT1oNs §§ 5179-5181 (Perm. Ed. 1932).
7. In re Speir, 69 App. Div. 149, 74 N.Y. Supp. 555 (1st Dept. 1902) expressly
considered the amount of the required bond but the statute under which the case was
decided specifically gave the court control over the amount.
8. 6 UNiFORm LAWs ANNOTATED 22-23. The Commissioners' Note to § 17 states
"This section represents the prevailing rule. Cook §§ 359, 403." Id. at p. 23. 2 CooK,
CoRIuoAvioNs § 403 (6th Ed. 1908) describes the bond as "varying in amount accord-
ing to the amount of stock and the clearness of the proof of loss." This is a possible
argument to show the intent of the drafters of the Act on a theory of incorporation
into the legislative history by reference.
9. Bringardner Lumber Co. v. Crockett's Adm'x. 304 Ky. 324, 200 S.W.2d 753
(1947) ("appropriate bond") ; Dyer v. Bridge Heights Realty Co., 170 La. 1092, 129
So. 647 (1930) ("in an amount to be fixed within its discretion"); State v. New
Orleans Land Co., 10 La. App. 676, 120 So. 893 (1929) ("$1,000 sufficient") ; 47
HARv. L. REv. 885, 886 (1934).
10. Instant case at 166.
11. The premium for an open-penalty bond is 6% of the market value of the
stock; for a fixed-penalty bond, 2% of the amount of the penalty. Rate Manual of
the American Surety Association, 82 Reverse, 83. Note that the degree of risk
implied in issuing a new certificate, though relevant in the court's determination of
the amount of a fixed penalty is an underwriting consideration only as to whether or
not the surety company is willing to execute the bond; see, e.g., Application for Lost
Instrument Bond of the Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. which is typical.
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corporation does not in every case necessitate the unlimited guarantee of
an open-penalty bond against loss at the expense of the stockholder. Trans-
fer agents may be requested or required to replace certificates that have
been lost under a wide variety of circumstances.12  In some instances, the
incident of loss may be a conclusively proved destruction of the certificate.
Even where it is in existence, the caution customary in stock transactions,
together with the legal requisites for transfer, impose barriers to the nego-
tiation of a security by one not having the indicia of ownership.13 Further
affecting the chances of reappearance of a certificate in the hands of a bona
fide holder is the length of the time lapse since its loss. Thus, in many
instances the risk of liability of the corporation will be no more than a
theoretical possibility.14 And in any event, once indemnified by a bond in
double the market value of the stock, it can never be exposed to loss unless
there has been more than a 100% increase in the market value. In short,
the danger of liability to the corporation ranges as widely as the circum-
stances under which a duplicate certificate may be sought. There is a
point where increasing improbability merges with 'practical impossibility.
Judicial discretion is competent to discern that juncture. Allowing discre-
tion in fixing a set penalty rather than insistence on an open-penalty bond
whenever issue of a duplicate is ordered would make a saving available to
the stockholder where it is justified without preventing a requirement of
broader coverage where caution warrants it. The interest of the stock-
holder calls for judicial or legislative re-examination of the instant case.
Courts-Conflict Between State Supreme Court Rules and Stat-
utes Governing Procedure-Plaintiff instituted a suit in New Jersey
to expunge an alleged libel from a grand jury report. The appeal from
summary judgment for the defendant was dismissed since it was not taken
within the forty-five day period prescribed by the New Jersey supreme
court rule.' The supreme court denied defendant's contention that a
statute providing for appeal time of one year was controlling,2 holding that
court rules of procedure, although required by the New Jersey constitution
12. In the usual case the corporation will not compel the stockholder to resort
to court action to secure a new certificate. CHRISTY & MCLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF
STOCK, § 275 (2d ed. 1940). Hence, the rule as to the amount of the surety bond
adopted by the courts will have a far more reaching effect than will appear in the
reports. The present practice of transfer agents seems to vary between requiring
the two types of bond involved in the instant case: cf. Id. § 276 and COWEE, BANKERS
& BROKERS BLANKET BONDS 129 (1938).
13. MACKALL, THE PRINCIPLES OF SURETY UNDERWRITING 337-339 (1940).
Whether a certificate has been indorsed or is accompanied by a blank power is thus
an important inquiry. •
14. Surety losses on lost securities bonds have seemingly been few in number
and small in amount which is indicative of the generally slim hazard of liability-
imposing reappearance of the lost certificates; e.g. see sample statistics in BACKMAN,
SURETY RATE MAKING 431 (1948).
1. N.J. RULES 1:2-5(b) (1948).2. N.J.S.A. §2:27-356 (1939).
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of 1947 to be "subject to law," are subject only to substantive law and not
to procedural statutes. Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1950),
cert. denied, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3130 (1950).
Procedural rule-making was practiced in the English common law
courts before the colonial period, but the hesitancy of ultra-conservative
judges to reform highly technical procedure led to widespread legislation
governing practice and procedure.3 But the statutory machinery for the
control of this field in turn became cumbersome, and the need for a more
flexible administration of justice led to a movement beginning in England,
4
to return the rule-making power to the judiciary. Today courts of last
resort in approximately thirty states have the power to make rules for
themselves as well as for all inferior tribunals.5 In many states the rule-
making power is considered inherent; 6 in others the power is given by
statutes; 7 and in others the power is expressly conferred by state constitu-
tions.8 Regardless of the source of the court's power, when a rule of court
comes into conflict with a statute guaranteeing "substantive" rights, all
courts subordinate the rule.9 Likewise, where a court rule conflicts with
a "procedural" statute, passed before or after the rule, a majority enforce
the statute.10 This limitation on the rule-making power is often imposed
by the enabling statutes 1 or constitutional provisions; 12 but even where
there is a recognition of an inherent power or a grant of a seemingly abso-
lute power to make rules, the power is quite consistently held to be subject
to procedural legislation."3 The only contrary cases found were decided
under statutes specifically providing that rules of courts as to practice or
procedure should prevail over conflicting legislation. 14 The instant court
3. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
4. 36 & 37 Vic., c. 66, § 74. This solution for the deficiencies in the legislative
practice codes was adopted in the federal judiciary system by an act of Congress. 48
STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723(b) (1946).
5. Hartshorne, Progress in Judicial Administration, 21 RocKy MT. L. REv. 235,
243 (1949).
6. See, e.g., Pankey v. City of Mobile, 250 Ala. 566, 569, 35 So. 2d 497, 499
(1948) ; Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619, 630, 283 N.W. 710,
712 (1939).
7. E.g., Ky. STAT. § 949 (Carroll, 1915), Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 60, 77
S.W.2d 351 (1934).
8. E.g., NEB. CoNsT. Art. 5, § 25, Nichols v. State, 109 Neb. 335, 191 N.W. 333
(1922).
9. Washington-Southern Navigation Company v. Baltimore & Philadelphia
Steamboat Company, 263 U.S. 629 (1924) ; see Brewer v. State, 187 Tenn. 396, 401,
215 S.W.2d 798, 801 (1948).
10. E.g., Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 21 So. 2d 827 (1945) ; Anderson v. State,
54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P.2d 308 (1942) (inherent power) ; De Camp
v. Central Arizona Light & Power Company, 47 Ariz. 517, 57 P.2d 311 (1936) (abso-
lute power).
14. PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 17, § 61 (Purdon, Supp. 1949), Jameson v. Fowle, 46
Pa. D. & C. 511 (1943) ; IND. STAT. § 2-4718 (Burns, 1933), Holt v. Basore, 77 N.E.2d
903 (Ind. App. 1948).
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completely repudiated the majority view in holding that the phrase, "sub-
ject to law," as used in the constitutional provision that the "Supreme
Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the
state and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts," 15
does not mean subject to procedural legislation, but means substantive law
as distinguished from pleading and practice.
All that was necessary to decide the instant case was a holding that
supreme court rules passed in accordance with the 1947 Constitution super-
sede procedural statutes, existing at the time of its adoption. Such a hold-
ing would be sensible and legally defensible in the light of the recent con-
stitutional grant of the rule-making power.16 In an effort to prevent a
resurgence of the procedural morass existing in the New Jersey courts
prior to the Constitution of 1947,17 the present court went beyond the scope
of the instant controversy in declaring its complete independence of the
legislature. It seems that the construction of the phrase, subject to law,
so as to preclude legislative interference with court rules is unwarranted
in view of the prevailing recognition of legislative supremacy in this area,'8
the legislative history of the constitutional provision in question, 19 and the
consequent unbridled authority thus given to the supreme court. In setting
up a procedural-substantive dichotomy, the court has necessitated future
interpretation of legislative enactments which conflict with court rules, to
determine whether they are substantive and thus invalidate the rules in
question, or whether they are procedural and thus ineffective. Since the
distinction between procedure and substance is often difficult to perceive,20
there is a grave possibility that the court's supreme power to make rules
might one day infringe upon the substantive law. The marked improve-
ment in the practice and procedure of the New Jersey courts, absent legis-
lation, since the promulgation of the court rules in September, 1948, com-
15. N.J. CONST. Art. VI, § 2, 113.
16. Another section of the constitution likewise favors this construction. N.J.
CONST. Art. XI, § 1, 3 provides that "All law, statutory and otherwise . . . in
force at the time this Constitution or any article thereof takes effect, shall remain in
full force until they expire or are superseded, altered or repealed by the Constitution
or otherwise" (emphasis supplied).
17. For a description of the "ancient defects" see Hartshorne, Progress ilt New
Jersey Judicial Administration, 3 RUTGERs L. REv. 161 (1949).
18. Recognized in New Jersey as late as 1946 in Willis v. Shore, Yellow Cab
Company, 24 N.J. Misc. 62, 46 A.2d 59 (1946).
19. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Constitutional Convention, 1947,
at p. 17. "Responsibility for administration, practice and procedure in all the courts
of the State is vested in the Supreme Court, but the Legislature may revise or repeal
the rules of practice and procedure, or initiate new provisions on the subject."
In July, 1947, Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt, who wrote the majority opinion in the
instant case, sent a letter to the judiciary committee of the constitutional convention
stating that the phrase, "subject to law," would make the rulemaking power subject
to legislative control, and suggesting the deletion of that phrase from the constitution.
O'Connor, Court's Right to Make Rules, Newark News, July 13, 1950.
20. McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws,
78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 933 (1930).
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mends the instant decision; 21 yet, case law outlives those who make it,
and conceivably future supreme courts in New Jersey will be as conservative
as the instant one is progressive. This would result, under the present
interpretation of the constitution, in a procedural moratorium immunized to
the will of the people.
22
Criminal Law-Contempt-Power of the Federal Judiciary to
Treat Perjury in a Grand Jury Investigation as Contempt of Court-
Petitioner was questioned by a federal grand jury as to the source of
monies which she had recently deposited in various bank accounts. Her
explanation that $18,000 had been given to her by a man whom she hadn't
seen since 1934 resulted in a request by the grand jury that the witness
be compelled to answer truthfully. The district judge, upon hearing, ad-
judged her guilty of contempt of court in refusing to testify truthfully.1 The
conviction was affirmed on the ground that the witness obstructed the
investigation of the grand jury by preventing it from ascertaining the truth.
Howard v. United States, 182 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1950).
The Act of March 2, 1831 2 gave federal judges authority to punish
misbehavior in the presence of the courts, "or so near thereto as to ob-
struct the administration of justice." While a conviction for perjury re-
quires indictment and a trial by jury, a perjurer may also be held in con-
tempt if, in addition to the elements of perjury,3 there is present in his
testimony some element of "obstruction to the performance of 'judicial
duty." 4 Thus, witnesses summoned by investigatory grand juries have
been repeatedly punished for refusal to answer, or for giving patently
false or evasive answers to questions posed to them. The theory of these
cases is that a recalcitrant witness "blocks the inquiry" r of an agency of
the court by forcing it to obtain the required information from other
sources, a procedure which often takes time and expense. The power
has been consistently upheld in cases in which the answers given took
21. Vanderbilt, Our New Juadicial Establishment: The Record of the First Year,
4 RUTGERs L. RFv. 353 (1950).
22. Instant case at 418-419 (concurring opinion).
1. Her confinement was to continue until she should agree to testify truthfully, but
could not extend beyond the grand jury's term of service, which was to expire in
about seven months.
2. REv. STAT. §725 (1878), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §401 (1948).
3. Perjury consists of: (1) a false and material statement, (2) intentionally
made, (3) under oath, (4) in a judicial proceeding. 48 C.J. 824.
4. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919).
5. In re Michael, 146 F.2d 627, 629 (3d Cir. 1944), rev'd, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
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the form of easily recognized shams 6 or obviously intentional losses of
memory.7 However, in IN RE Michael,8 the Supreme Court reversed a
contempt conviction where the testimony of other witnesses was necessary
to convince the trial judge that the petitioner's testimony was false. Based
upon the constitutional guarantee in criminal cases of a trial by jury,9
rather than by a judge, the decision turned on the requirement that the
obstructive effect of the perjury be "clearly shown".1 0 The court in the
instant case, in what it deems an application of the test used in the Michael
case, holds that the necessary element of "obstruction" is present when-
ever a witness testifies untruthfully in order to avoid giving material in-
formation.
If the witness in the instant case did not testify truthfully, she could
have been indicted for perjury; but, under the mandate of the Michael
case, she should not have been held in contempt. Although all perjury
is inherently obstructive, answers which are responsive and straightforward
should not be considered as satisfying the requirement of a "clear show-
ing".'1 There should appear in the record some evidence of misconduct
other than testimony which is merely of doubtful veracity. Because of the
difficulty attached to obtaining perjury convictions,12 the contempt power is
sometimes a more effective means of eliciting the truth. But abuse of the
power may violate the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Furthermore, an indiscriminate use of the power may actually dis-
courage witnesses from talking at all. Since the privilege against self-
incrimination is only available under strictly circumscribed conditions,'"
6. See, e.g., United States v. McGovern, 60 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 650 (1932) (when asked to account for $380,000, witness made vague intima-
tions that he had used some of it for charity, gambling and family expenses). But
cf. Blim v. United States, 68 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1934) (court acknowledged that
testimony, while highly sentimental in nature, could have been true).
7. See, e.g., Schleir v. United States, 72 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 607 (1934) (witness couldn't remember how many $1000 bills he had carried on
his person) ; Lang v. United States, 55 F.2d 922 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 286 U.S.
523 (1932) (bank emyloyee couldn't remember how an unusually large account was
handled, when it was evident that he had made special note of it). For an example
of extreme obstinacy, see O'Connel v. United States, 40 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 667 (1935) (witness refused to answer some 25 innocu-
ous questions by claiming privilege against self-incrimination; consistently answered
"I don't remember" to others).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2.
10. 326 U.S. at 228.
11. Both the Michael and Hudgings cases, supra, pointed out that perjury can not
be the sole basis of a contempt conviction, but may be one of the components of the
"obstruction" charged. For an elightened interpretation of the Michael case in an-
other context, see United States v. Goldstein, 158 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1947) (perjury
committed before an appellate court).
12. The number of perjury charges dropped by prosecuting attorneys is far
greater than the average number for all crimes. See McClintock, What Happens to
Perjurers, 24 MiNN. L. REv. 727 (1940).
13. See Camarota v. United States, 111 F.2d 243 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
651 (1940), and cases cited therein.
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and hence is of little or no utility, a witness with something to hide must
usually either give some answer or face a contempt citation. When an
honest answer will expose him to indictment for a major crime, he will
resort to falsehood or silence and suffer the shorter sentence that goes
with a contempt conviction. If such a witness is advised by counsel that
he can be held in contempt for any answer which does not satisfy the
judge's conception of the precise truth, he is likely to resign himself and
refuse to give any answer. Even false testimony may be better than no
testimony, since the investigator may get enough information out of it to
enable him to eventually discover the truth. The more rigid test re-
quired by the Michael case may favor the witness whose deceit is cleverly
enough concealed to avoid a citation for contempt, but the proper deterrent
for such witnesses is the imposition of heavier perjury sentences. The
contempt power should be exerted only in those cases where it is plainly
evident, without collateral inquiry, that the testimony given does not
amount to a bona fide effort to answer at all. While the holding in the
instant case is broad enough to allow a contempt conviction for almost
any relevant perjury, it need not necessarily lead to unduly harsh results
in the future, since this area of the law is fertile for factual distinctions.
Criminal Law-Mann Act Conviction Requires a Finding That
Only One Purpose for Transportation Need Be Immoral-In a prose-
cution for violation of § 2 of the Mann Act,1 the accused contended that
he transported the girl from New Hampshire to Massachusetts, not for
the purpose of having intercourse with her, but to prevent her from tes-
tifying against him in pending proceedings in New Hampshire for statutory
rape, and that this purpose was not illegal under the Act. The court
charged that defendant would be guilty of a violation if the jury found that
one of his purposes in transporting the girl was to have intercourse with
her, and he was convicted; on appeal conviction was affirmed. The Circuit
Court raised the question whether the Mann Act is violated when only
one of defendant's purposes is found to be immoral and held such a finding
to be sufficient for conviction. Daigle v. United States, 181 F.2d 311 (1st
Cir. 1950).
The Mann Act, passed in 1910, was Congress' remedy for the vicious
international and interstate white slave trade that had grown to great pro-
1. WanTE SLAvE TRAffic AcT, §2, 18 U.S.C. §398 (1946), 18 U.S.C. §2421
(Supp. 1949). "Any person who shall knowingly transport . . . in interstate or
foreign commerce . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution, or de-
bauchery, or for any other immoral purpose . . . shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony. . ..
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portions in the preceding years.2  The clear Congressional intent was to
place heavy sanctions upon the forced movement in commerce of women
and girls for purposes of commercialized vice, but to leave to the states
the protection of morality in general.3 However, from the earliest inter-
pretation of the Act, the intent of Congress was ignored by the courts;
the legislation was construed to penalize transportation for immoral pur-
poses devoid of any aspect of commercialism, and involving no coercion
of the person transported.4 This result was reached by the courts' refusal
to look beyond the letter of the statute.5 Though this reading of the Act
greatly increased the scope intended by Congress, and has met with much
criticism,6 it became well settled that a violation of the Act occurred when-
ever a man transported a woman in interstate commerce for the sole pur-
pose of having intercourse with her.1 Nor need that sole purpose be ac-
complished 8 so long as that purpose did exist at the beginning of the in-
terstate trip,9 or at least developed before it was over.', The courts next
decided that a defendant who had two purposes for an interstate trip,
one of which was moral and the other immoral, could be convicted under
the Act "1 upon a finding by the jury that "one" purpose,' 2 or an "induc-
ing" purpose,13 or a "necessary" purpose 14 for the trip was to engage in
the immorality that followed. The test for guilt in multiple purpose cases
2. H.R. REP. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), SEN. REP. No. 886, 61st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1910).
3. See 45 CONG. REc., 545-51, 804-23, 1030-41, 9037-42 (1910).
4. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ; Johnson v. United States,
215 Fed. 679 (7th Cir. 1914).
5. The prohibition of the statute being set out plainly ". . . and not leading to
absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate
legislative intent." Caminetti v. United States, supra at 490. But cf. Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). The conflict between the
"plain meaning doctrine" of the Caminetti case and the "doctrine of legislative intent"
of the Holy Trinity case is well aired in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
6. See Justice McKenna's Dissent in Caminetti v. United States, supra at 502;
Justice Murphy's Dissent in United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1945);
Jones, Statutory Doubt and Legislative Intent, 40 COL. L. R-v, 957, 961 (1940).
7. Johnson v. United States, supra.
8. Cholakes v. United States, 2 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1924), cert denied, 267 U.S.
604 (1925).
9. Corbet v. United States, 299 Fed. 27 (9th Cir. 1924).
10. Sloan v. United States, 287 Fed. 91 (8th Cir. 1923).
11. Carey v. United States, 265 Fed. 515 (8th Cir. 1920). It was, however,
necessary that the prospect of intercourse should be a motivating factor or reason for
the trip, and if the sole purpose for the trip was moral, then a purely "incidental in-
tent to have intercourse" was not a federal offense. Yoder v. United States, 80
F.2d 665, 672 (10th Cir. 1935). This distinction between "motivating purpose" and
"incidental intent", being somewhat tenuous, was probably difficult for a jury to
apply. Compare Yoder v. United States, supra; Ghadiali v. United States, 17 F.2d
236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 747 (1927), with Hansen v. Hoff, 291 U.S.
559 (1933) ; Alpert v. United States, 12 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Sloan v. United
States, supra.
12. Carey v. United States, upra, at 518.
13. Van Pelt v. United States, 240 Fed. 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1917).
14. Hunter v. United States, 45 F.2d 55, 56 (4th Cir. 1930).
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remained thus until the decision of Mortensen v. United States 15 in 1944.
The Supreme Court, by dictum, attempted to limit the force of the Act by
setting up a more stringent test for guilt, i.e., that the immoral purpose of
the accused should be the "dominant motive" for the interstate movement.16
This requirement seemed to imply that juries were now to balance the
relative weights of different purposes, and predicate guilt only on a finding
that the dominant motive for a trip is immoral. But the language of the
Mortensen case,'1 7 has not been afforded that much respect. Though lip
service was paid to the "dominant motive" test,18 its utility was practically
destroyed, either by distinguishing each subsequent case on its facts ' 9 or by
ignoring the true significance of the test.2 ° Finally, the instant case, simply
refuses to apply it.21
The court has brought the First Circuit into line with those other
cases which continue the law as it was interpreted before the Mortensen
attempt to tighten the requirements for guilt under the Act. Also, this
court makes the most outspoken rejection to date of the dictum in the
Mortensen case. However, before assuming the superiority of the older
law, it is well to balance its deleterious results against its efficiency in
providing for easy convictions under the Mann Act. The Federal Gov-
ernment is regulating in an area never contemplated by Congress; 22 men
are being punished as felons in the federal forum for moral transgressions
that constitute at most, misdemeanors in the states; 23 and, the possible
blaikmailing of interstate travelers, urged in Congress before the passage of
the Act,24 has become a real danger. 25  It may still be doubted whether
the rule which the instant case entrenches more firmly, is in the best
interests of society.
15. 322 U.S. 369 (1944). This case held that the interstate transportation of
two prostitutes on a vacation trip, unconnected with their profession, was not a
transportation for a purpose raising criminality under the Mann Act. Justice
Murphy, going beyond the words of the Act, desired to restrict the scope of the
Act, and concluded that Congress had never intended this type of prosecution. But,
by refusing to review past decisions and interpretations, the decision loses much of
its controlling force, for it is readily distinguishable on its facts from such cases
as Caminetti v. United States, vtpra, and Johnson v. United States, supra. See Note,
33 GEo. L.J. 114 (1944), 23 N.C.L. REv. 147 (1945).
16. Mortensen v. United States, spra at 374.
17. This test was unnecessary to reach the decision in the Mortensen case be-
cause there, the Court found no evidence at all of an immoral purpose for the trip;
thus, that case did not involve dual purposes in which the question of primary motive
would arise. See Note, 56 YALE L.J. 718, 722-23 (1947).
18. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946); Long v. United
States, 160 F.2d 706, 709 (10th Cir. 1947); United States v. Jamerson, 60 F. Supp.
281, 284 (N.D. Iowa 1944).
19. Simon v. United States, 145 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1944).
20. Mellor v. United States, 160 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 848
(1947).
21. The court held that, had the Supreme Court intended to establish a stricter
standard for guilt, ". . . it would have given the matter more detailed consideration
and stated its conclusion in more explicit terms." Daigle v. United States, 181
F.2d 311, 314 (1st Cir. 1950).
22. See Note, 56 YALE L.J. 718 (1947).
23. United States v. Beach, supra at 199-200.
24. 45 CONG. Rlc. 1033 (1910).
25. See Yoder v. United States, supra at 666; Carey v. United States, supra at
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Income Taxation-Non-Resident Alien Trust-Allocation of In-
come from Within the U. S. Between Resident and Non-Resident
Alien Beneficiaries-A foreign will directed that all income be paid
to foreign trustees, who were to pay a fixed amount each year for life to
widow, a resident alien in the United States, and the balance to son, a non-
resident alien. Part of the income came from a domestic corporation, and
the trustees directed this corporation to pay the fixed amount to widow
and then send the residue to son. Son, the taxpayer, reported only the
amount of income he actually received from the U. S. source, and the
commissioner assessed an income tax deficiency against him for his failure
to include in his return the proportionate share of the trust income he
theoretically received from the domestic source. The Tax Court, with
three dissents, upheld the commissioner's contentions,' and the circuit court
affirmed. Muir v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 182 F.2d 819 (4th
Cir. 1950).
A non-resident alien must pay income tax on all income derived from
sources within the United States.2  The commissioner has had little diffi-
culty in applying this general rule; however, the existence of a foreign
trust with both foreign and domestic income, as well as foreign and resi-
dent beneficiaries, presents a novel problem. It must first be remembered
that a trust is a separate and distinct taxable person,8 which must file a
return of trust income. 4 The trustee is allowed a deduction for the amount
of income distributed to beneficiaries which then becomes taxable in their
hands.5 Income which is tax exempt remains so whether in possession
of trustee or beneficiary.6 In order to prevent trustees from arbitrarily
giving one beneficiary taxable income and another beneficiary tax-free
income, the doctrine of proportionate allocation was introduced into tax
law. Thus by statute, a beneficiary of a trust is allowed as a credit against
his net income his proportionate share of tax-exempt interest received by
the trustee.7 By case law it has been held: (1) that a distribution of
income must be considered as having been made ratably from taxable and
non-taxable income; 8 (2) that expenses must be allocated ratably between
exempt and non-exempt income; 9 and (3) that depreciation deductions
must be allocated between charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries.'0
1. Muir v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 307 (1948).
2. INT. REV. CODE §§ 211, 212.
3. Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 516 (1920).
4. INT. REv. CoDE § 142.
5. INT. REV. CODE § 162(b).
6. INT. REV. CODE: §§ 162, 22(b), 116.
7. INT. REv. CODE § 163(b).
8. Estate of Traiser v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 228 (1940).
9. Meissner v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 780 (1947).
10. Scott v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 811 (Ct.CI. 1948) Grey v. Commissioner,
41 B.T.A. 234 (1940), aff'd, 118 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1941).
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Throughout these decisions, which concern only domestic trusts and do-
mestic income, runs the concept that whenever income is removed from a
trust, it is in theory removed from each source in a proportion which is
determined by the amount that that source contributes to the total income.
Though the instant court accepted this doctrine in reaching its de-
cision, this case presented a unique set of facts which possibly could have
been better solved by a more realistic approach. An analysis of the
holding shows that theoretically the foreign trustees are compelled to send
foreign income to the widow in this country, which in turn forces an
equal amount of domestic money to be added to the income already leaving
this country. This means that the widow is, in theory, paying tax on
both domestic and foreign income, and the non-resident alien beneficiary is
paying a tax on an increased amount of domestic income which is theo-
retically being sent to him. Thus a point could easily be reached where
the non-resident alien's taxes amount to a sum which is larger than the
amount he is actually receiving from the domestic sources. 1 In view of
present day "blocked currency" legislation in many foreign countries, the
collection of this tax would probably prove to be a practical impossibility.' 2
Had the court held that the taxpayer need only pay taxes on the amount
actually received from sources within the U. S., it would have reached a
result which: (a) would be more in accord with the realities of the
transaction; (b) would just as readily fit into the ambiguous language of
the statute; 1a (c) would be supported by authority which permits the tax
consequences to follow the physical segregation and identification of
funds; "4 (d) could be accomplished by a testator's specific direction in a
will;15 and (e) would tax the entire amount of domestic income which
belongs to the trust.' Although the theory behind the decision is sound,
and although the result means an increase in revenue, it is nevertheless
suggested that, because of the peculiar factors which may surround foreign
trusts and foreign laws, a different result could prove more workable in
the long run.
11. Widow, as a resident alien, would be taxed on the full amount distributed
to her regardless of its source. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29. 211-1. Assume that the
trust received $30,000 of foreign income and $10,000 of domestic income. If widow
were to get $8,000 a year it would mean that theoretically $6,000 of her total would
come from foreign income, which in turn would mean that $8,000 of the domestic
income would go to son. By applying a flat 30% rate (INT. REV. CODE § 211) to this
sum, the tax would be $2,400 or $400 more than the amount actually being sent back.
12. For the general rules relating to exchange control, see NusSBAUM, MONEY
IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, p. 449. 450 (1950).
13. INT. REv. CODE § 212 (a) ". . . gross income includes only the gross in-
come from sources within the United States."
14. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123 (1934); McCahan v. Commissioner, 35
B.T.A. 943 (1937) ; Flinn v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1085 (1938).
15. KENNEDY, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF TRuSTS AND ESTATES, p. 276 n. 8
(1948).
16. The entire amount gets taxed either way; it is just a question of who pays
the tax, and at what rate.
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Patents-Disclosure of Equivalent in Specification and Doctrine
of Equivalents in Chemical Composition-Plaintiff sued defendant
for infringement of a patent for an electric welding flux which claimed "a
composition containing a major portion of alkaline earth metal silicate." 1
Defendant's flux was composed mostly of manganese silicate which the
trial judge found was not an alkaline earth metal silicate.2 The trial judge,
applying the doctrine of equivalents, held that defendant's flux infringed
plaintiff's patent because the equivalence of manganese and magnesium
silicate (an alkaline earth metal silicate) was pointed out in the specifica-
tion.3  The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of infringement. 4  On a
rehearing confined to the applicability of the doctrine of equivalents the
result was reaffirmed on the grounds that a finding of equivalence was a
question of fact and, being supported by the record, could not be disturbed.
The court ignored those findings of equivalence based on the specification
and relied on other findings by the trial court to support the trial court's
application of the doctrine of equivalents. These other findings were:
"Lincolnweld 660 Flux can be substituted for Unionmelt 20 without any
change in operation or result except that Lincolnweld composition induces
a greater amount of manganese into the weld metal. It is clear then that
for all practical purposes, manganese silicate can be efficiently and effectively
substituted for calcium and magnesium. . . ." 6 Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
Under the Patents Statute an inventor is required "to particularly point
out and distinctly claim the part, improvement or combination which he
claims as his invention or discovery." 7 It has often been reiterated by the
Supreme Court that the measure of the monopoly granted to the patentee
is to be found in the claim, not in the specification.8  Where the actual in-
vention, described in the specification, is larger than that claimed, what
is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public.9 Reference may be
1. Claim 18, United States Patent No. 2,043,960.
2. Linde v. Graver, 86 F. Supp. 191, 198 (N.D. Ind. 1947).
3. ". . . no determination need be made whether it is a known chemical fact
outside the teachings of the patent that manganese is the equivalent of calcium or
magnesium .... (this fact) is fully disclosed in the specification of their patent."
Id. at 199.
4. 336 U.S. 271 (1948).
5. Instant case at 858.
6. Linde v. Graver, mzpra at 199.
7. Ray. STAT. § 4888 (1875), 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1940). This mandate of the legis-
lature is effectuated by Rule 75 of the Patent Office which requires the specification
to conclude with such a claim. AMDUR, PATENT OrrIcE RuLES AND PRACTICE 168
(1949).
8. Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 23 (1943); Milcor Steel
Co. v. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145-6 (1942) ; Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Greenleaf, 117
U.S. 554, 559 (1886).
9. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 423-4 (1891); Miller v. Brass Co., 104
U.S. 350, 352 (1881); Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1881); Sontag Stores
Co. v. Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 293 (1940).
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made to the specification to explain an ambiguity in the claim. 10 Where
the claim in a patent is clear and distinct, however, the patentee is bound
by it 11 and the claim can never be enlarged beyond "a fair interpretation" 12
or "the plain import" 13 of its terms. The purpose of Congress in requiring
definitive 14 claims is that the public may be informed of the exact extent
of the monopoly granted and of what remains in the public domain.1 The
Supreme Court in the instant case by implication reaffirms the established
rule that a claim cannot be enlarged by reference to the specification, since
it refused to base its decision on the same findings as those relied on by
the lower court.
While expansion of a claim by reference to the specification is not
permitted, the Supreme Court has held that a claim may include more than
what is literally described. This result is achieved through the operation
of the doctrine of equivalents.' 6 Under that doctrine the court will find
that the use of substance A infringes upon a patent claim for substance
B by finding A to be the equivalent of B. There is much confusion, how-
ever, in the decisions concerning what is necessary to support a finding of
equivalence. In a great number of cases the sole test applied to find
equivalence is that anything is the equivalent of another which "performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
the same result." 17 In other cases, however, the courts have required
not only that the two devices perform the same function in substantially
the same way to reach the same result, but have in addition required that
this be known to those in the field.' 8 Although knowledge has not usually
been required in cases involving mechanical equivalents, 19 when the doc-
10. Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Co., 198 U.S. 399, 410 (1905).
11. Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877).
12. Haines v. McLaugh, 135 U.S. 584, 596 (1889) ; Day v. Fair Haven Ry., 132
U.S. 98, 102 (1889).
13. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886) ; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix
Iron Co., supra at 278.
14. "It must be understood that the claim in a patent is not a mere suggestion of
what the alleged invention is, but is a definition of it." WAGNER, DAMAGES, PROFITS
AND ACCOUNTING IN PATENT CASES 83 (1926).
15. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcelus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945); Sontag
Stores Co. v. Nut Co., supra, at 293.
16. Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 329 (U.S. 1853).
17. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929); Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 414 (1908) ; Machine Co. v. Mur-
phy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
18. ". . . if the ingredient substituted for the one withdrawn was a newly dis-
covered one, or even an old one performing some new function, and was not known
at the date of the plaintiff's patent as a proper substitute for the one withdrawn, it
would not be an equivalent for the ingredient omitted. . . " Gould v. Rees, 15
Wall. 187, 193 (U.S. 1872) ; Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 1, 10 (U.S. 1874) cited in Halli-
burton Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 13 (1946); Imhauser v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 656
(1879). All of the above cases involved mechanical equivalents.
19. Cases cited note 17 supra.
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trine of equivalents has been extended to chemical equivalents the lower
courts, with few exceptions, have required it.20 The instant case is the
first case since 1872 in which the Supreme Court has considered the ap-
plicability of the doctrine of equivalents in a chemical coniposition case on a
question of infringement. While the Court states that knowledge of the
equivalence by those in the field is an important factor, it relies only on
findings which show that the two fluxes were identical in operation and in
result, apparently applying the usual test of equivalence in mechanical
cases to chemical composition cases. 21
The object of the doctrine of equivalents is to prevent the pirating of
a meritorious invention by the substitution of a component which is known
to be interchangeable with the component claimed in the patent. Allowing
the patent to cover the use of a component which was not known to be in-
terchangeable with the one claimed would discourage further experimenta-
tion and search for new and unknown things to accomplish the same
function.22  This, in effect, would give the patentee a patent on an end
result rather than on the means for achieving it, which the Supreme Court
has often disallowed. 23 The explanation for the fact that the lower courts
have not been content to apply the "same result in substantially the same
way" test to chemical composition cases, but have insisted on spelling out
the knowledge requirement, can be found in the nature of the subject mat-
ter. In the case of mechanical devices it is usually a question of the appli-
cation of old and well-known principles of mechanics in new combinations
or in new ways to achieve a new result.2 4 In most mechanical cases the
principles involved are within the knowledge or experience of the judges.
Thus when a judge makes the determination of equivalence in a mechanical
case he is applying his own knowledge and experience and so it seems
unnecessary to inquire whether those in the field have this knowledge.25
Industrial chemistry, on the other hand, is a recent science and most of
the principles of chemical action are known only to those in the field. In
chemical composition cases, the application of just the "same way" test
of equivalence is of doubtful utility in achieving the protection of invention
and at the same time in avoiding the patenting of a result instead of the
20. American Chemical Paint Co. v. J. G. Brill Co., 99 F.2d 602, 605 (3rd Cir.
1938) ; Woodward v. Morrison, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,008 at 559 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872);
Mathew v. Skates, Fed. Cas. No. 9,291 at 1135 (C.C.S.C. Ala. 1860).
21. Instant case at 858.
22. Halliburton- Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946).
23. Singer v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265, 286 (1903) ; Westinghouse v Boyden Power
Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 569 (1897).
24. To prehistoric mechanics we owe the lever, the wedge, the saw and probably
the pulley. The discoveries of the fundamental principles in mechanics, hydraulics and
pneumatics can be traced to the Greek mechanicians of Alexandria, including Archi-
medes. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 546 (14th Ed. 1929).
25. See Machine Co. v. Murphy, supra at 126: "Apply that principle [the "same
way" test] and it is clear that the knife in the respondent's machine . . . is substan-
tially the same thing as the cutter in the machine of the complainants . . ." (Italics
added).
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means for achieving it. A finding, such as that relied on in the instant
case, that chemical A and chemical B are identical in operation and result
does not really touch the question of whether the equivalence of the two
was known. The "same result in the same way" test could be applied to
such findings to find equivalence even though one of the chemicals was
truly a new discovery unknown at the time of the patent issuance.
